The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.
of the best available results on uniqueness of mixed strategy equilibrium.
Lebrun [9, 10] , Maskin and Riley [12] , and Bajari [3] prove uniqueness of mixed strategy equilibrium given independent private values and any number of asymmetric bidders. 4 Given two asymmetric bidders having affiliated types
and interdependent values, Lizzeri and Persico [11] (LP) proves uniqueness of MPSE. This paper differs from LP by allowing for more than two bidders while requiring symmetry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and assumptions. Section 3 then proves the main result on uniqueness of MPSE given symmetric bidders. Section 4 concludes with an extension to all-pay auctions.
Model and preliminaries
Information: Bidder types are one-dimensional random variables having joint density f (t) on the unit cube [0, 1] n . For each subset I ⊂ {1, ..., n}, the conditional joint density will be denoted f (t I |t −I ) where t ≡ (t 1 , ..., t n ), t I ≡ (t i : i ∈ I), and −I ≡ {1, ..., n}\I. (Bold notation will be used throughout the paper to refer to vectors of types, bids, and strategies.) (A1) Bidder types are affiliated, i.e. f (t ∨ t)f (t ∧ t) ≥ f (t )f (t) for all type profiles t , t where t ∨ t, t ∧ t are their component-wise maximum and minimum, respectively.
Affiliation is a powerful form of positive correlation; see Milgrom and Weber [15] for more detailed discussion.
(A2) There exists f high , f low > 0 such that f (t) ∈ [f low , f high ] for all t.
(A3) f is continuously differentiable on [0, 1] n . Interim expected payoff: Π i (t i , b) is bidder i's expected utility (or 'payoff') from bidding b conditional on own type t i and others' equilibrium strategies. For all b > max{b, r},
Bids and
for all types t i having a best response.
for all i.
Reny and Zamir [17] guarantees existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium ('MPSE') in a more general model allowing for bidder asymmetry.
Theorem 1 There is a unique MPSE in the symmetric first-price auction, up to the bids made by a zero measure set of types.
The rest of the paper proves Theorem 1, via several intermediate 'claims'.
More technical parts of the proof are relegated to the Appendix.
Symmetry at the highest types
Recall our notation for highest bids,
Proof of Claim 1. By Lemma 6, either b i = OU T for all i or b i > max{b, r} for all i. We need to prove that b i = b for all i given that b i > max{b, r} for all i.
Without loss, suppose for the sake of contradiction that b 1 = b and b 2 < b. By Lemma 3, there are no atoms at bid-level b i for any i. By Lemma
Since there are no atoms at b 1 , each bidder would win with probability one if he were to bid b 1 . Thus, bidder 2 must get the same expected utility as bidder 1 given type t = 1 when bidding b 1 :
On the other hand, if bidder 1 were to bid b 2 , he would win more frequently than bidder 2 does with the same bid, and have a weakly higher expected utility when winning:
(1) follows from symmetry of bidders 1,2 combined with Lemma 1(a). (Set X ≡
(2) uses the fact that bidder 1 is strictly more likely to win with bid b 2 than
Intuition for Claim 1. The crucial step was to show that b 1 > b 2 implies
There are two reasons for this. First, bidder 2 bids less than b 2 with probability one while bidder 1 bids more than b 2 with positive probability. Consequently, conditional on bidding b 2 , bidder 1 is strictly more likely to win the object than bidder 2. Second, conditional on bidding b 2 and winning, bidder 1 faces 'winner's curse' to a lesser degree than bidder 2. This is because bidder 1 wins the object regardless of bidder 2's type, whereas bidder 2 only wins when bidder 1 has a relatively low type.
Continuous differentiability near where symmetric
Claim 2 Suppose b i (t+) =b > max{b, r} for all i. Then b i (t−) =b for all i. Proof of Claim 5. Preliminaries.
Given (A3,4), it is easy to check that a ij (b, φ) and c i (b, φ) are continuously differentiable (in all variables). 
The weak inequality follows from Lemma 1(a). (Set X ≡ {t : t i =t, t k ≤ t ∀k = i} and X\A ≡ {t : t i =t, t j =t, t k ≤t ∀k = i, j}.) The strict inequality follows from Lemma 5, since b i (t−) =b > b implies that typet must get positive expected utility.
Using shorthandâ defined above, the matrix A(b) = A(b,t, ...,t) takes the special symmetric form 
Since type φ i (b) finds bid b to be a best response, the following system of n equations must be satisfied by
As long as A(b) is invertible, we may express system (3) as:
is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of (b,t) for all i. This is more than enough to imply the Lipschitz condition needed to apply the Fundamental Theorem of Differential Equations (FTODE). where φ(·) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable.
All MPSE are symmetric.
Recall our shorthand for the lowest winning bid b ≡ max i b i (0+). For each bidder i, define t i ≡ φ i (max{b, r}+).
is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable over (t, 1) and (iv) b(t) = OU T for all t ∈ (0, t). 
is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable}. (So far, we have shown 8 The Lipschitz condition in our case requires that M < ∞ exists such that, for all i, 
for all i when these neighborhoods are small enough. Thus, we may set M = max i 2 1≤j≤n 
a contradiction. We conclude that
where φ(·) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable over (max{b, r}, b).
Equivalently, b i (t) = b(t) for all t ∈ (t, 1), where t = φ(max{b, r}) and b(·) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable over (t, 1).
To complete the proof, we need to show that b i (t i ) = OU T for all t i < t. There are two cases to consider.
First, suppose that max{b, r} = b. By definition, there exists j * such that
is vacuous in this case.
Second, suppose that b = OU T so that max{b, r} = r. In this case, b i (t i ) ∈ {OU T, r} for all i and all t i < t. By Lemma 2, at most one bidder (say bidder 1) can have an atom at r, so b i (t i ) = OU T for all i = 1 and all t i < t. Thus,
and almost all t i < t. By symmetry of bidder
for all i and all t. Since no bidder i = 1 has an atom at r, lim δ→0 Π 1 (t 1 , r + δ) = Π 1 (t 1 , r) for all t 1 . Lastly, by (A3-4), Π 1 (t 1 , r) is continuous in t 1 . All together, we conclude that Π 1 (t, r) ≤ 0. Since
All types t 1 < t strictly prefer not to participate rather than bid r, a contradiction.
Unique 'minimal winning type' and 'minimal winning bid'. 
Proof of Claim 7. Each bidder gets zero payoff given type t, since he gets zero payoff given any type less than t and payoffs are continuous in t i (Lemma 4(a)). Thus, 
Thus, in either case, equilibrium requires that h(t, b(t+)) = 0.
Furthermore, from the proof of Claim 6, b(t+) = max{b, r} and b > r is only possible when t = 0. Thus, equilibrium requires h(t, max{b, r}) = 0 and either
Case I: h(0, r) ≥ 0. t = 0 in this case: otherwise, max{b, r} = r so that
Case II: h(0, r) < 0 and h(1, r) > 0. Now t ∈ (0, 1). Otherwise, h(t, max{b, r}) ≤ h(0, r) < 0. Thus, b = OU T and t is uniquely determined by h(t, r) = 0.
Case III: h(1, r) ≤ 0. Here t = 1 and b ≤ r. Otherwise, h(t, max{b, r}) < h(1, r) ≤ 0. As discussed earlier, b ≤ r implies b = OU T . Thus, t = 1 and b = OU T . This completes the proof.
Uniqueness of MPSE.
Consider Case I in which t = 0, i.e. the reserve price is not binding. (The proof for Cases II, III proceeds in a similar way and is omitted.) So far, we have shown that any MPSE must be symmetric: 
Further, all MPSE must be strictly ordered in the sense that b
are two MPSE where
. By symmetry, each bidder's first-order condition (3) in each equilibrium can be re-arranged as:
where bolded notationt I = (t i =t : i ∈ I).
By (A5), u is strictly decreasing in b. Since b 1 > b 2 , the denominator of (5) is strictly less than the denominator of (6). (One can show that the denom-9 Define t * ≡ min{t >t : b 1 (t) = b 2 (t) for all t ∈ (t,t)}. One shows t * = 1 by repeating, with minor modifications, the argument in the proof of Claim 6 that Fig. 3 . Graphical intuition why equilibria can not be ordered.
inators in (5, 6) are positive, in the same way that we showedâ > 0 in the proof of Claim 5.) By (A6), ∂u/∂b is non-increasing in b and negative, so the numerator of (5) is weakly greater than the numerator of (6) (and both are positive). Thus,
Graphical intuition why strictly ordered MPSE can not exist. Consider bidders' first-order conditions in both equilibria given typet > 0. 
.) For the same small increase in the bids, the two horizontal rectangles have the same area. Since b 2 (t) > b 1 (t), the vertical rectangle for equilibrium 1 has more height. Since bidder 1 must be indifferent to raising its bid in each equilibrium, the vertical and horizontal areas must be the same in each equilibrium, implying that the vertical rectangle for equilibrium 1 has less width. That is to say,
But this contradicts the presumption that b
and these bid functions are continuous.
Extension: All-pay auctions
The first-price auction has the property that bidders get the same utility from losing as from not participating. This property is not essential to my analysis.
What is essential is that each bidder's payoff does not depend on others'
bids (except insofar as others' bids determine the winner). More precisely, suppose that bidders have different utilities from winning and losing the object,
) is strictly increasing in t i and non-decreasing in t −i .
All-pay auctions:
In the all-pay auction, losers pay their own bid and one can check that (i,ii,iii) are satisfied. Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 implies that the all-pay auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
10
Yet whether the all-pay auction has mixed strategy or non-monotone pure strategy equilibria is unknown, so the question of uniqueness remains partially unresolved.
Proof of Lemma
The strict inequality holds since u i is strictly increasing in t i and strictly decreasing in t i . 11 The weak inequalities hold by successive applications of MW Theorem 23.
12

Proof of Lemma 2
Preliminaries: By definition,
and likewise for similar conditional expectations. 12 g i is non-decreasing in t. For the first inequality, consider sublattice X ≡ {t i } × Consider any b ≥ r. The result is immediate if every bidder bids b with zero probability. Suppose without loss that bidder 1 bids b with positive probability, so that φ 1 (b+) > φ 1 (b). All types in (φ 1 (b), φ 1 (b+)) bid b and almost all of them find b to be a best response. Lett 1 ∈ (φ 1 (b), φ 1 (b+)) be some type for which b is a best response. Interim expected payoff for this type is
Define the following shorthand: 
Step 1: Restrictions imposed by best response. Since b is a best response, typẽ t 1 does not prefer to submit the null bid OU T nor to bid slightly more than
Step 2: Either k * = 1 or Suppose instead that k * > 1. Note that 0, φ −1 (b+) is a lattice and that, for all m ∈ {1, ..., k * }, ∪ m k=1 G(k) is a decreasing subset of 0, φ −1 (b+) . 13 Thus, Lemma 1(a) implies that
is strictly increasing in t by Lemma 1(b). Thus, at most one bidder 1-type finds b to be a best response. But almost all types in (φ 1 (b), φ 1 (b+)) find b to be a best response, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3
By assumption, Pr (b > max i b i (t i )) > 0, so φ i (b) > 0 for all i. Furthermore, 13 Each set in this union has the form, up to a zero measure set, of
given no ties (Lemma 2) there is at most one bidder (say bidder 1) with an atom at b.
Step 1: Someone else bids just below b. There can not be a gap in the distribution of max j =1 b j (t j ) below b. If there were, bid b would be strictly dominated for bidder 1, contradicting the presumption that almost all types t 1 ∈ (φ 1 (b), φ 1 (b+)) find b to be a best response. Thus, there exists a bidder j * = 1 with a convergent sequence of types {t j * ,k } k=1,2,...
Without loss, we can select this sequence so that type t j * ,k finds b j * (t j * ,k ) to be a best response for all k.
For sufficiently large K,
by Lemma 5. (The proof of Lemma 5 does not depend on Lemma 3.) Indeed,
profits of slightly higher types are strictly bounded above zero: for all k > K,
The first weak inequality is by revealed preference, the strict inequality is by Lemma 1(b), and the last inequality follows from assumption (A2).
Step 2: No one else bids just below b. Each type t j * ,k must at least weakly prefer to bid b j * (t j * ,K ) = b − δ k rather than b + δ k . Since bidder 1 has an atom at b and all other bidders bid strictly less than b with positive probability, raising his bid by 2δ k allows bidder j * to increase his probability of winning by an amount that does not disappear as δ k → 0.
For these deviations to be unprofitable, then, bidder j * must not strictly prefer to win the object at price b conditional on tying (in the limit):
The second inequality follows from Lemma 1(a).
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of (a).
lutely continuous in t i for each fixed b and
exists for each fixed b. Indeed, by (A3-4), u i (t i ; t −i ; b) and f (t −i |t i ) are continuously differentiable, so 
By Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal [14] , we may therefore conclude that 
Proof of (b). Consider any type t i such that b i (t i −) > max{b, r} and any increasing sequence {t k } t i such that b i (t k ) is a best response for type 
The proof that b i (t i +) is a best response when b i (t i +) > max{b, r} is very similar and omitted to save space.
Proof of Lemma 5
Consider any type t i such that
is strictly increasing in t for all b.
Proof of Lemma 6
If b = OU T we are done, so suppose that b ≥ r for the rest of the proof.
Without loss, suppose that b 1 = b.
Step 
for all i = 1 and almost all t i < 1, and bidder 1 wins the object with probability one when bidding b. Repeating the argument in the text leading to (4), replacing type t with type 1 and bid r with bid b = b, we conclude that Π 1 (t 1 , b) < 0 for all t 1 < 1. Thus, all types t 1 < 1 strictly prefer not to participate rather than bid b, a contradiction.
Step II: b = r. Suppose otherwise. Since b 1 (1−) = r, bidder 1 must have an atom at bid-level r while (by Lemma 2) b i (t i ) = OU T for all i = 1 and all t i < 1. This leads to a contradiction, as in Step I.
Step III: 1, b) . The first equality holds since there are no atoms at b 1 , the second since each type t k plays a best response, and the third by Lemma 4.
Step IV: b i > max{b, r} for all i. By Step I-II, b > max{b, r}. Without loss, suppose that b 1 = b and b 2 ≤ max{b, r}. By definition, bidder 2 never wins the object and gets zero payoff when he bids less than max{b, r}. By
, then all types t 2 < 1 bid less than max{b, r}. Consequently,
Finally, suppose that b 2 = max{b, r}. Again, Π 2 (t k , b 2 (t k )) = 0 for all k and a contradiction is reached unless b 2 (t k ) = b 2 for all large enough k, i.e. bidder 2
has an atom at max{b, r}. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that no other bidder has an atom at b 2 . But then
For the first equality, note that W 1 (b 2 ) is by definition the event in which all bidders i = 1 bid strictly less than b 2 ; inequalities (10, 11) are then identical to (1, 2) in the text. This again contradicts Step III.
Step V:
Since b i > max{b, r}, we may simply repeat for all bidders i = 1 the argument used in Step III to show that 1, b) . This completes the proof.
Proof of Claim 2
Without loss, assume that
Suppose that b 1 (t−) <b. Sinceb > r, there must be a gap in the distribution of bids belowb, so thatb is strictly dominated for all bidders. Sinceb > b, however, Lemma 4 implies that all bidders must findb = b i (t+) to be a best response given typet. This is a contradiction, so b 1 (t−) =b.
Suppose that b n (t−) <b. Several steps establish a contradiction.
As mentioned above, bidder 1 findsb to be a best response given typet, so Π 1 (t, b 1 (t) = Π 1 (t,b).
By Lemma 4, lim ε→0 Π n (t − ε, b n (t − ε)) = lim ε→0 Π n (t + ε, b n (t + ε)). There are no atoms atb by Lemma 3, so lim ε→∞ b n (t + ε) =b implies lim ε→0 Π n (t + ε, b n (t + ε)) = Π n (t,b). Since φ i (b) =t for all i, finally, symmetry implies
Hence bidder 1 wins the object with positive probability given typet − ε. By Lemma 5, then, Π 1 (t,b) > 0. The desired result follows now from the first point above.
(Bidder 1 has types less thant that bid more than b n (t−).) To prove (iii), suppose that φ i * (b n (t−)) = 0 for some i * , i.e. b i * (t i * ) ≥ b n (t−) for all t i * > 0. Bidder n wins the object with zero probability with any bid b < b n (t−). As we have seen, however,
, we conclude that b n (t n ) = b n (t−) for all t n ∈ (t−ε,t), i.e. bidder n has an atom at bid-level b n (t−). By Lemma 2, no other bidder can have an atom at b n (t−), including
Hence, all bidder-n types in (t − ε,t) win the object with probability zero and get zero profit. This is a contradiction.
Fourth, no bidder i = n has an atom at bid-level b n (t−). There are two cases
bidder has an atom at b n (t−) by Lemma 3. (B) If b n (t−) = b, it must be that b n (t − ε) = b for all small enough ε, i.e. bidder n has an atom at b. But then no other bidder can have an atom at b by Lemma 2.
Fifth, Π 1 (t, b 1 (t)) > lim ε→0 Π n (t − ε, b n (t − ε)), contradicting the first point.
By bidder 1's revealed preference, Π 1 (t, b 1 (t)) ≥ Π 1 (t, b) for all b. Thus,
The first equality holds by definition: 14 Suppose for the sake of contradiction that b i (φ i (b)) =b for some i and somẽ denote any bidder for whom
To complete the proof, we need to show that such a bidder i γ does not exist for small enough γ > 0.
Recall Definition 4 (ε(γ)) Define ε(γ) > 0 so that lim γ→0 ε(γ) = 0 and
for all i, j and all b ∈ (b − γ,b). Without loss, suppose that bidder 1 is one of the bidders who is active above b γ . For any decreasing sequence of types {t
Without loss, we may assume that lim k→∞
exists for all i (possibly infinite). (Otherwise, select a subsequence such that this limit exists for bidder 1, a further subsequence so that the limit exists for bidder 2, and so on.)
Revealed preference of bidder 1. By construction, bidder 1 finds b k 1 to be a best response for type t
By the proof of Lemma 5, we may then conclude that P 1 (t
We conclude that W J > 0 for all J {2, ..., n}. Thus, in particular,
for all i. All together, we conclude that
for all k > k, where
Since these inequalities hold for all k, they must also hold when we divide both sides by b
The first equality relies on the fact that each bidder's inverse bid function is 
Combined with (16), we conclude
In particular, since b γ ∈ (b − γ,b) by presumption,
The weak inequality follows from (20); the strict inequality is by definition of ε(γ).
We are now ready to define bidder i * and the sequences {t where lim γ→0 δ(γ) = 0. Sinceâ,ĉ > 0, the right-hand-side of (26) is positive for all small enough γ > 0. This is a contradiction and completes the proof.
Proof of Claim 4
Let γ > 0 be that identified by Claim 3. Thus, the left-derivative and derivative exists:
Finally, the derivative is continuous at b γ since C(b γ ) * A −1 (b γ ) is continuous.
Thus, φ i (·) is continuously differentiable over (b − γ, max{b + γ, b}) for all i.
